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In the Netherlands, as in many other European countries, municipal councils are a 
crucial link in local representative democracy. In the traditional model of 
representative democracy the council is in a pivotal position in an ‘electoral chain of 
command’ (Dearlove 1973: 25-46). As being the directly elected representatives of 
the electorate, councillors are primarily responsible for the translation of local inputs 
(citizen demands and needs) into authoritative decisions to be executed by the local 
political executive and its officers (Denters 2005: 432).  
Figure 1: Traditional model of representative democracy 
 








It is immediately obvious that in such a model the council and its members have to 
perform two complementary roles. On the one hand the representative role: here the 
key criterion is the responsiveness of the council vis-à-vis the local citizenship. On the 
other hand the council will have to control and supervise the local political executive 
and the municipal officers. In this paper we will refer to the second role as the 
scrutiny function of the council. Here the main criterion is whether the council is 
capable of securing the accountability of the executive leadership and its 
administrative apparatus.  
As we have already argued more extensively in several other publications 
(Denters and Klok 2003, 2005; Denters et al. 2005; Denters 2005) both functions of 
the council in Dutch local government have come under pressure. On the one hand the 
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council’s representative role has been challenged, because of a decline in electoral 
turnout in municipal elections and party membership, and an increasing use of 
alternative channels for political participation. On the basis of such developments the 
democratic primacy of the council as the “voice of the people” is not as evident as it 
may have been previously (Denters 2005: 427-429).  
The council’s scrutiny role is equally problematic. For long years the capacity 
of the council to control and supervise the political executive and the administrative 
apparatus has been questioned. In the light of the increasing responsibilities of local 
government and the ensuing growth of its executive branch, it was argued that the 
councillors – as essentially amateur (part-time) politicians – could play little more 
than a marginal role in local politics. The shift from government to governance and 
the consequent fragmentation of the local government system have made the scrutiny 
role of the council even more problematic (Denters 2005: 425-427).  These 
developments are by no means specifically Dutch. Similar tendencies can be observed 
in other countries in and outside Europe (see Denters and Rose 2005: 255-261). In 
various countries these developments have given rise to reviews of the role of the 
elected council in local government. In both the Netherlands and the UK efforts have 
been made to reinvigorate both the representative and the scrutiny role of the council 
(Denters and Rose 2005: 255-261).  
 
In this paper we will discuss the results of the Dutch reforms that were introduced in 
2002. At the core of the Dutch council reforms were a number of major legislative 
changes, resulting in a major restructuring of the local government model. However, 
the reformers were convinced that merely changing the ‘rules of the game’ would not 
suffice to bring about the desired improvements in the quality of local representative 
democracy – in terms of responsiveness and accountability. Therefore, prior to the 
introduction of the legislative reforms in 2002 and in the four years thereafter, the 
Association of Dutch Municipalities and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations launched an intensive campaign to support the institutional changes. In 
combination, the legislative changes and the campaign would have to result in major 
changes in the role conceptions and the behavior of councillors, ultimately resulting in 
a better functioning local democracy. In this paper our main question will be whether 
these local government reforms have indeed brought about the anticipated changes in 
the role conceptions of councillors. In the view of the reformers, this form of cultural 
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change is an important condition for the desired behavioral changes (at the level of 
individual councillors) and ultimately on the democratic quality of local government 
(at the aggregate level of the council). Although our focus will be on cultural change, 
the penultimate section will also provide some research-based evidence about the 
possible consequences of the reforms for the democratic performance of councils.        
 
Before we turn to this question we will first of all outline the main elements of the 
reform.  
1.1 The Dutch reforms 
After the enactment of the Municipal Law of 1852, most of the main elements of the 
model of local democracy in Dutch municipalities have remained unaltered.1  In this 
traditional model the directly elected municipal council was at the head of municipal 
government, at least in formal terms. There were, however, two additional offices in 
municipal government with independent powers – the Mayor and the Board of Mayor 
and Aldermen (BMA). Councillors elected the aldermen on the BMA from their own 
ranks, and the council could also dismiss them. After their election, aldermen 
continued their membership in the council and their party group in the council. The 
Mayor – who was appointed by central government on the basis of a shortlist drawn 
up by a committee from the council – had several powers granted by national law in 
the fields of public order and public safety. The BMA, in addition to its general 
responsibility for the preparation and implementation of council decisions, had 
specific powers in executing many national policies. Both the Mayor and the BMA 
were responsible to the council for their use of these powers. In a formal sense, in 
other words, the primacy in local decision making rested with the council. In practice, 
however, the centre of power resided with the BMA. Because of their political weight 
(partly the result of the combined membership of the council and the BMA), their 
information advantage, and the professional support of their staff, relations between 
aldermen and ordinary councillors are normally heavily tilted in favour of the former 
(Denters and Klok 2005: 69-70).  
As has been already indicated, the traditional model came under increasing 
pressure and was finally replaced in 2002. Then a new Municipal Law was enacted, 
                                                 
1 The most important changes pertained to successive extensions of the suffrage for local elections, 
broadening the scope of the democratic legitimation of the council. 
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based on the proposals of a Royal Commission. The 2002 reforms had a dual aim. On 
the one hand they were aimed at strengthening the actual position of the council vis-à-
vis the BMA and creating favourable conditions for better executive accountability 
with regard to council. This was done by a series of measures strengthening the 
independence of the council. The two most important measures in this respect were: 
1) abolishing the aldermen’s membership of the council 2) the provision that 
aldermen no longer can act as chairs of council committees. Moreover, the councils 
were given new formal powers in order to be better able to perform their powers of 
scrutiny. Finally, the support for councillors to perform their duties was improved. 
Table 1 provides a more detailed overview of the various measures. These measures 
were especially needed since the 2002 reform entails a concentration of governing 
authorities with the board. 
In addition to strengthening the council’s actual position in the local political 
process, the reforms also aimed at strengthening the representative function of the 
councillors: “The main idea here was that the concentration on the control and 
scrutiny roles would allow councillors to invest more time and energy in their relation 
with the citizenry. This would imply a reinforcement of their traditional representative 
role which would result in a more responsive municipal government.” (Denters 
2005: 432).  
 
Table 1: The 2002 reforms: most important measures 
Type of measure: Short description: 
Position - Strengthening independence by abolition 
double role of the Aldermen 




- Obligation for Mayor and BMA to inform 
council actively on all that may be deemed 
relevant for the council to perform its duties  
- Rights of control for councillors (initiative; 
amendment) 
- Information rights (parliamentary questions; 
interpellation; parliamentary inquiry) 
- New budgetary instruments for the council    
Support functions - Introduction of Council Clerk 
- Introduction of local Court of Audit  
- Right of administrative support and advice  
  (Source: Denters 2005: 431) 
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 2.  Mechanisms of change 
In this paper we are interested in the consequences the 2002 reforms may have had for 
democratic accountability and democratic responsiveness in Dutch local democracy. 
As we will explain in more detail in the methodological section, accountability and 
responsiveness are concepts that can refer to both the attitudes (role orientations) and 
the activities of individual councillors and to the political culture and performance of 
the council as a collective body. For the main part of this paper we will focus on 
changes in the individual role orientations of councillors. In this section we will 
therefore first discuss which mechanisms can explain how institutional changes 
outlined in Table 1 could have an effect on relevant role orientations of councillors. 
Therefore the main question in this section is how the envisioned attitudinal changes 
can take place? Theoretically there are two mechanisms of change of (Chatman 1989, 
1991; Knoke 1973; Oldham and Hackman 1981). Firstly, the mechanisms of 
socialization: councillors who work under the new institutional conditions will 
gradually adapt to their new environment and develop new attitudes and habits. 
Secondly, the mechanism of exit and selective recruitment. This is very much a two-
sided process. On the exit side, incumbent councillors who do not feel at ease or 
dysfunction in the new institutional environment may decide not to run for office 
again or may be “thrown” out in favor of their more well-adapted colleagues. On the 
recruitment side, the new institutional conditions may be more attractive for some 
aspiring councillors (with different backgrounds, “new” attitudes and habits) than for 
others (with a more “traditional” profile). At the same time the institutional reforms 
may enthuse recruiters to select “nontraditional” new candidates rather than new 
candidates with a more traditional mindset.  
The two mechanisms might change the person-organization fit (PO fit). The 
PO fit entails the congruence between organizational norm, values and goals and 
personal values and goals (Cable and Judge 1996, 1997; Cable and Parsons 2001; 
Chatman 1989, 1991).  The PO fit influences the individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
(Kristof 1996; Pervin 1989). Low fit2 could have at least three outcomes: the person 
                                                 
2 High fit is not always preferable: organizations and its members may become unable to react upon 
environmental changes. Low fit enhances members to grow and learn. Organizations might bring in 
persons with different perspectives and new ideas helping organizations to adapt to changing 
environments. Therefore Chatman (1989) speaks of an ‘optimal fit’. (Chatman 1989). 
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adapts to the organization, the organization’s values change (not very likely), or the 
person leaves the organization. In creating a PO fit socialization and selection are not 
competitive processes, but they can operate jointly to get a desired outcome (Chatman 
1989: 345). 
 
The mechanism of socialization is a psychological phenomenon that leads to personal 
change, and we can observe it when we compare attitudes and activities of individual 
councillors over time: by comparing e.g. his/her attitudes or activities on T0 and T1. 
The mechanisms of exit and selective entry however are about “change of 
personnel”; new councillors replacing incumbents leading to changes in the 
composition of the council. We can observe such compositional changes by 
comparing the attitudes and activities of discharged councillors (DC) with re-elected 
councillors (RC) and with the newly-elected councillors (NC).       
Although both mechanisms should be analytically distinguished they may be very 
difficult to disentangle. Unless, for example, we interview newly-elected councillors 
before or right after their election it will be hard to tell to what extent their attitudes or 
activities are the result of recruitment or of socialization.  
 
2.1 Socialization 
Socialization refers to learning processes that shape people’s attitudes, cognitions, 
skills and activities. Socialization takes place in numerous contexts, in families, in 
schools, in informal groups (e.g. amongst friends), in voluntary associations and 
formal organisations. All these social contexts, unintentionally or sometimes also 
deliberately, shape their members’ views and actions. Formal organisations, in 
addition to informal mechanisms of socialization, have often designed programs to 
stimulate the development of attitudes, skills and activities amongst its members, in 
order to bring about organizational change or to make the organisation function more 
effectively (Biddle 1979; Fischer 1986; Saks and Ashfort 1997; Van Maanen 1976; 
Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Municipal councils are not any different, and have a 




Feldman (1981) states that researchers and practitioners expect socialization programs 
to increase the motivation of employees to certain types of behaviour (Feldman 1981: 
317). Socialization programs are especially important during reorganisations. In order 
to make structural reforms in the formal organisation work, it is often deemed 
necessary to supplement the structural reforms with programs to change the attitudes, 
skills and behaviour of the members. For precisely these reasons the Royal 
Commission that proposed the structural reforms of the Dutch local government 
model also advocated a (re-socialization) program aimed at transforming the local 
political culture in the councils. Without such cultural change, the Commission 
argued that the legislative reforms in the new Local Government Act 2002 alone 
would not be enough to bring about the desired changes in councillor roles. Following 
the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations provided a four-year budget for an ambitious Local Government 
Innovation Program. This program, that was developed and executed in close co-
operation with the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG), entailed a cooperation 
of several relevant actors (including the various political parties, and the professional 
associations of mayors and chief-executive officers in local government). The 
program provided for a wide range of activities, including the publication of a regular 
newsletter and guidebooks on the practical implications of the reforms, conferences 
for councillors and other target groups, training modules, facilities for counseling and 
advice and research to monitor the implementation of the reforms. An internet 
platform was introduced to re-enforce and propagate the program by providing 
municipalities with information and support and exchanging ideas for renewal and 
best practices. By use of this website current initiatives enhancing a cultural change 
were mapped and made accessible. The main aim of the program was to stimulate that 
councillors, under the new legislative regime, would indeed change their role 
orientations and role behaviour and henceforth give a high priority to their 
representative and scrutiny functions (Staatscommissie Dualisering 2000; 
Startdocument Vernieuwingsimpuls 2000). 
 
Resocialization is about establishing a match between the priorities and values of the 
individual and the organization. A match leads to organization members who are 
happier, have positive feelings, and are more likely to stay a member of the 
organization (Chatman 1991; Meir and Hasson 1982). Those members who have a 
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low fit but decide to change rather than to leave may end up as being valuable 
supporters of the organizations values, priorities and goals (Chatman 1991: 464).  Re-
socialization focuses on reshaping prevalent attitudes and values (McCorkle and Korn 
1954) and is therefore bound to be a toilsome process.  Socialization not only 
provides actors with attitudes, but also with a ‘cultural bias’ with which they ‘view 
the world’ (Thompson et al. 1990). Changing such an established biased view is likely 
to be a very time-consuming process with insecure results. Therefore, it has been 
argued that ‘[t]rhythms of institutional change are slow’ (Putnam et al. 1993: 60).3  
The socialization process basically comes down to the enculturation of 
organization members (O'Reilly and Caldwell 1979; Ott 1989; Schein 1968; Schein 
1985). However, some individuals can be more susceptible to socialization than 
others. ‘Previous studies have shown that susceptibility is greatest at the time of entry 
into the organization and then declines with tenure (Louis 1980)’ (Harrison and 
Carroll 1991). Hence, organizational tenure matters: it is an external variable that 
needs to be taken into account. Organizational tenure in the context of our research 
refers to the number of years the actor served as a councillor under the old 
institutional regime. The experience of the old regime has an influence on the 
mechanism of socialization. Councillors and aldermen that came into office under the 
‘ancient regime’ were socialized under the rules and the prevalent role orientations of 
the time; orientations that were backed by a history of 150 years. It can be expected 
that the product of such a process of socialization (attitude, skills and action 
repertoires) are hard to change.  
This expectation is supported by the Upper Echelons Perspective (UEP). 
According to this perspective managerial/executive background characteristics 
partially predict organizational outcomes in terms of strategic choices and 
performance levels (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Hence, certain profiles lead to 
                                                 
3 After all, the institutional context exerts a strong influence on people’s actual behavior (Bruns and 
Waterhouse 1975; Dalton 1980; Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989). Through a variety of rewards 
(‘increased prestige, stability, legitimacy, social support, internal and external commitment, access to 
resources, attraction of personnel, fit into administrative categories, acceptance in professions, and 
invulnerability to questioning’; Oliver 1991) individuals are motivated to comply with external social 
pressures (e.g. government regulations, here, LGA 2002) (Oliver 1997).  
Such structure-induced behavioural changes need not be accompanied by consistent attitudinal 
changes. People could very well be merely ‘going through the motions’. But people also have a natural 
tendency to reduce inconsistencies between their actual behaviour and their behavioural orientations. 
When it is impossible to undo the institutional reforms, at least some of the members will therefore be 




certain strategies/behaviour. An important background characteristic is organizational 
tenure (Bergh 2001). Short-tenured members, pursue more innovative strategies 
compared to longer tenured members (Bantel and Jackson 1989; Thomas et al. 1991). 
Furthermore, executives with short organizational tenure are characterized by open-
mindedness (Bergh 2001). Long-tenured employees are possibly more committed to 
prior strategies (Hambrick et al. 1993) which might result in resistance to change. In 
Bergh’s (2001) words: 
 
Executives committed to former methods of managing the organizations, who rely on 
routine and familiar information sources, are vulnerable to inertia, and have 
tendencies to become rigid and resistant to change … 
(Bergh 2001: 608) 
 
Yet, there is also theoretical support for the opposite argument: the longer an 
actor serves in an organisation, the more flexible the actor is in adapting to changes in 
the environment. Bergh (2001: 603) describes the Resource-Based View (RBV): 
organization members with long organizational tenure have the advantage of unique, 
valuable and non-transferable knowledge and skills not available to their less 
experienced colleagues (Cannella and Hambrick 1993; Lanzara 1998). On the basis of 
these resources more experienced members are more open-minded and better able to 
adapt to new circumstances. Less experienced actors on the other hand are forced to 
stick to a standard action repertoire. (Bergh 2001). In the context of our research this 
implies that this points to an alternative hypothesis: longer tenured councillors have 
the skills that allow them to adapt to a changing environment which also makes them 
less change-averse than their less experienced colleagues. Although this argument has 
its merits, in our view the first hypothesis is more plausible. The second perspective 
ignores the fact that – especially in a political context – standard action repertoires are 
inextricably bound up with vested interests and power relations. Taking this into 
account would imply, that although long-tenured, more senior members may be 
capable of changing their ways, they would be unwilling to do so because of their 
vested interest in the status quo.   
 
Hence, which tenured group deals best with socialization processes can be argued 
about. But fact is that socialization plays an important role for new members. By 
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learning the newly recruited councillors immediately the new way of working and the 
new roles of the council, the possibility of councillors showing the desired behavior is 
increased. New members are often blank as far as experience with the new Local 
Government Act is concerned. This increases the likelihood that they will adopt 
attitudes and behavioral strategies in line with the new institutional arrangements. 
Feldman (1981) describes this specific socialization process as a three-phase process4 
(Feldman 1976; Porter et al. 1975; Van Maanen 1975). The first phase regards 
‘anticipatory socialization’, referring to all the learning that is done before a new 
member joins the organization. This stage entails realism about the organization and 
the job. The second phase is concerned with ‘encounter’ (Porter et al 1975; Van 
Maanen 1975): the new recruit discovers what the organization is truly like, change in 
attitudes and shifting of values may occur. This stage focuses on the formulation of a 
role definition and the management of role conflicts. The third phase has to do with 
‘change and acquisition’ (Porter et al 1975): changes for the long term take place, 
‘new recruits master the skills required for their jobs, successfully perform their new 
roles, and make some satisfactory adjustment to their work group’s values and norms’ 
(Feldman 1976: 310). This stage concentrates on the resolution of role demands and 
making satisfactory adjustment to the group culture. Phase two and three might 
overlap. The socialization process intensifies the enculturation of new members 
(O’Reilly 1989; Ott 1989; Schein 1968; Schein 1985).  
 
 
2.2 Mechanism of exit and selective recruitment 
The mechanism of exit and selective recruitment entails two important components: 
the (in)voluntary leaving of current members and the selection of new members. 
Hence, it is about membership turnover. The turnover process enhances the retention 
of highly socialized members and encourages the departure of those members who 
have not yet been successfully socialized (Harrison and Carroll 1991: 555; see also 
the attraction-selection-attrition framework5 of Schneider 1987). After the municipal 
                                                 
4 This process regards role definition (attitudes), skills (perceived behavioral control), and group norms 
and values (culture) (Feldman 1981). 
5 Similarities (in terms of values and goals) cause for attraction between individuals and organizations 
(Cable and Judge 1997: 546; Cable and Parsons 2001). Values guide individual’s attitude and 
behaviors (Chatman 1989; 1991). According to the ASA framework individuals are not randomly 
assigned to organizations but they work there based on selection (Cooper-Thomas et al. 2004: 55). The 
ASA framework explains the person-organization fit. 
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elections certain council members will leave the council and others will join. This 
section first discusses the decision of incumbents (not) to stand for reelection, after 
that we will turn to the recruitment of new members. 
 
Exit 
Why are people leaving an organization, or in this case: why leaving the council? 
Harrison and Carroll (1991) state that ‘individuals leave organizations for a wide 
variety of reasons, including better jobs, dissatisfaction, and family concerns’ 
(Harrison and Carroll 1991: 560). Councillors who think the reforms (will) have a 
negative effect on the realization of their personal objectives will have a stronger 
inclination to resign than actors who have a more positive attitude towards the reform 
(cf. Chatman 1991; Cooper-Thomas et al. 2004: 55; Denton 1999; Schneider 1987). 
An important element in this argument is the expectation that one will be able to do a 
satisfactory job. Councillors who think that the council reforms have negatively 
affected their capacity to do their work properly will be less inclined to stand for re-
election, than colleagues who have a more positive evaluation of the reforms.6  At the 
same time, councillors who were unable or unwilling to adjust their attitudes and 
behavioral strategies in line with the reforms are pressured by relevant others (e.g. 
party members, the party chair) to leave the council (cf. Harrison and Carroll 1991: 
560; cf. Schein 2000 (1999): 23). Both arguments imply a clash of opinions. In the 
first case there is an incongruity between the councillor’s personal normative role 
conception (ideas about what he ought to do) and his actual role performance. In the 
second case the relevant incongruity is between the normative role expectations (what 
should a councillor do?) of relevant others and their perceptions of the councillor’s 
role behavior.7 In both cases, however, the effect is that councillors who are satisfied 
with their job under the new regime and who – in the eyes of others – do a good job as 
a councillor are more likely to stand for re-election than councillors who are 
dissatisfied and who are considered to dysfunction.8      
                                                 
6 The idea of being able to do a proper job (or to act in conformity with one’s personal normative role 
conception – in the jargon of role theory) may be seen as the nucleus of one’s professional identity. 
Loss of identity of the apprehension of such a loss may be an important factor for people’s decision to 
retire (Schein 2000(1999)).   
7 In the literature such normative role expectations in the environment of the organization member have 
also been referred to as the ‘management ideal’ (Harrison and Carroll 1991; Wanous 1980). 
8 In both situations the final decision whether or not to retire rests with the councillorcouncillor. The 
two situations, however, differ because the locus of the initiative for the decision (not to run) differs. In 
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 Selective recruitment 
The other side of the recruitment process concerns the selection of new members. 
Here the recruiters typically want to select candidates whose profile matches the 
organization’s desired or current culture (Cable and Judge 1996; Cable and Judge 
1997: 546; Cable and Parsons 2001; Chatman 1989, 1991). Again the degree of 
congruity (P-O fit) is crucially important. Through careful search and selection, role 
incongruities can be minimized (Harisson and Carroll 1991: 554). 
This matching process has two sides: attraction of job seekers and selection by 
the organization (cf. Wanous 1980). Attraction entails the self-selection of people 
based on person-organization fit (Cable and Judge 1996). ‘People actively search for 
and choose an organization to join’ (Chatman 1989: 344). The first step in the process 
here is made by potential candidates. On the basis of personal motives (based on 
expectation about remuneration, prestige, job satisfaction and other ‘rewards of 
office’) people decide to apply or not. It is only after this that the selection 
commission can make its decision. In this context the role of such personal criteria is 
very important for the outcome (Wanous 1980: 10). Potential candidates will try to 
form expectations about the chances that they will be able to realize their personal 
objectives in the new position. An important element in this assessment is the degree 
to which aspiring councillors on the basis of their personal standards (normative role 
conception) expect to be able to do a proper job. Therefore, aspiring councillors will 
have an incentive to inform themselves properly about what this new job is about. At 
the same time the selectors and the municipality have an interest in supplying 
adequate information about the membership of the council, and the implication of the 
new legislation for the performance of this job (cf. Chatman 1991: 481).  
The other side of the matching process is selection by the organization. 
Recruiters use the P-O fit to select new members (Cable and Judge 1997). New 
recruits with already similar values and a close fit to the organization are more likely 
to show the desired behavior (Chatman 1989: 334, 344; Schneider 1987). On the basis 
of a set of pre-established criteria the selector approaches candidates who are likely 
                                                                                                                                            
the first case it is the candidate who on the basis of his personal criteria decides to retire. In the other 
case it is not the individual who initiates the decision but others who on the basis of their criteria feel 
that the incumbent fails and should retire. On the basis of such signals the councillor might opt for an 
honourable way out. 
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(or are already known) to meet these criteria. The invited candidates then have to 
decide whether or not they want to apply (and if selected whether or not they actually 
want to accept the position). This perspective is organization-centered, because it 
starts with the organization’s desire to minimize incongruities in order to improve job 
performance (Wanous 1980: 10). In the context of our research, municipalities, 
councils or political parties could look for new councillors by using a revised and up-
to-date recruitment profile.9 The aim is to recruit new local councillors who – in the 
eye of the selectors – will be able to do a proper job under the new institutional 
conditions.  
The implication of this is that in the process of recruiting new councillors, 
both the selectors and the candidates will try to make an assessment of the chances 
that the aspiring new council members will be able to perform adequately under the 
new legislative regime. Hence, the recruitment process is likely to be selective in the 
sense that councillors who think (or are thought) to be able to do a satisfactory job 
under the new legislative regime (viz. the LGA 2002) are more likely to be selected 




This research uses repeated surveys in order to measure the effects of the new Local 
Government Act which was implemented in 2002. In 1999 there was a pre-
measurement (T0), in 2007 a post-measurement (T1). A two-staged sample was used: 
all councillors in 150 municipalities received a mail-questionnaire. 
In 1998 a Royal Commission was established with the assignment to advice 
the government on which new institutional structure should be implemented in local 
government. On behalf of the Commission, the research bureau of the Dutch 
Associations of Municipalities conducted a survey of councillors in Dutch 
municipalities. These data are used as a pre-measurement of the 2002 institutional 
reform in Dutch local government. In 2007 the University of Twente conducted a 
second survey (post measurement) using the same sample and methods as in 1999. 
                                                 
9 The Dutch Association of Municipalities and The Ministry of Home Affairs have developed a 
Recruitment Profile of Councillors that local parties could use as a basis to revise their criteria for 
selecting their party’s candidates for the council elections after the introduction of the new legal 
regime.  
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Because of the fact that cultural change needs time, 2007 is a good year to look for 
effects, also, because it is one year after the municipal elections.10  
The data in 1999 and 2007 were collected by means of mail-questionnaires. 
The questionnaires (almost) exclusively consisted of closed questions. For both 
surveys respondents received an advance letter, informing the respondents about the 
aims of the survey. This letter also listed the support of important official 
organizations for the survey; in 2007 for example both the Association of Dutch Local 
Councillors and the national organization of Council Clerks incited the councillors to 
complete the questionnaire. The survey was also announced on the websites of these 
organizations. A few weeks after sending out the questionnaire non-respondents 
received a reminder, emphasizing the importance of their co-operation.   
In 1999 the Royal Commission Elzinga conducted a survey in 150 
municipalities in the Netherlands. The decision to study a sample rather than the 
entire population was made for practical reasons (mainly cost-related).  The data file 
IRIS, administered by the VNG, formed the basis for the random sample of 1999. 
This file is used, among other things, for the mailing of the VNG magazine. It is a 
complete and up to date file, containing home addresses of all the respondents. SGBO 
chose the municipalities as follows. Municipalities were selected from a numbered list 
(with all 538 municipalities ordered on the basis of population size) through a 
systematic sampling procedure where every fourth municipality was selected in the 
sample, beginning with a randomly selected starting number between 1 and 9).11 This 
sampling procedure guaranteed representativeness in terms of population size. 
Moreover the sample size of 150 also guaranteed representativeness in terms of an 
adequate representation of the sample in other respects, e.g. regional location. The 
1999 research had a response12 of 61%. 
In the 2007 survey we used the same sample as in 1999, in order to allow for 
adequate comparisons with the 1999 survey. Due to amalgamations, however, some 
of the municipalities in the 1999 sample were abolished and ‘new’ municipalities 
were formed. As a consequence the 2007 sample contains 143 municipalities. In 2007 
                                                 
10 The 2007 survey is conducted as part of an international survey of local councillors in which 14 
European countries participate: Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Poland and Finland. This research is a follow up 
of the European mayor study. 
11 Municipalities that were involved in recent amalgamations were excluded from the list. 
12 The 1999 respondents form a good representation in terms of municipal size and political parties 
(Staatscommissie Dualisering 2000).  
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we again used a mail questionnaire, which was send to all the councillors13. The 2007 
research had a response14 of 41%. 
 
 
4. Results: changing role orientations? 
The Dutch reforms were aimed at increasing the responsiveness and the 
accountability of local governments. The new legislation and the accompanying 
Innovation Program were aimed at strengthening the role of councillors as 
representatives and scrutinizers. In order to see how the reforms have affected 
relevant role orientations of Dutch councillors we have used four indicators. Two of 
these indicators refer to how councillors value activities aimed at securing their 
responsiveness to citizens. In our view responsiveness implies:   
- the extent to which councillors undertake activities to listen to the citizens in 
order to get an insight in their demands, preferences and needs, and  
- the extent to which they explain and justify the policy decisions to the citizens. 
(cf. Pitkin 1967; Van der Kolk 1997) 
   
On the basis of this definition it is obvious that responsiveness requires on the one 
hand that councillors are accessible and willing to listen carefully to citizens and local 
organizations15. On the other hand responsiveness also implies that councillors make 
continuous efforts to explain and justify themselves in public16.   
                                                 
13 Unlike 1999 we had to rely on municipal addresses instead of home addresses. In order to guarantee 
a reliable respondent list from the VNG: their list was checked twice (two months prior and again a few 
weeks before sending the questionnaire) and also corrected by looking at municipal websites for 
updates on the composition of the council. 
14 The 2007 respondents form a good representation in terms of municipal size, political parties, 
regions, age and gender. 
15 1999: How important is it for you as a councillor to represent the citizens in your municipality (a.o. 
ombudsman function)? (scale 1-4: not very important – very important) 
2007: How important is it for you as a councillor to represent the issues and demands that are of 
interest to the citizens? (scale 0-4: not important – very important) 
Notice, that the question wording and the range of the scale are somewhat different between 1999 and 
2007. We assume that the gist of the items is similar enough to warrant a comparison over time. Since 
the lowest score in 2007 (0) is never chosen we decided to ignore the scale difference. 
16 1999: Having contacts with citizens, local organizations and party supporters (members, 
sympathizers), how important is it to explain or justify council decisions? (scare 1-4: not very 
important – very important) 
2007: How important is it for you as a councillor to explain decisions of the council to the citizens? 
(scale 0-4: not important – very important). Again the question wording and the range of the scale are 
somewhat different between 1999 and 2007. We again assume that the gist of the items is similar 
enough to warrant a comparison over time. Since the lowest score in 2007 (0) is chosen only once we 
decided to ignore the scale difference. 
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Accountability refers to the relation of the council and the executive (see figure 1) and 
is defined as:  
- the extent to which councillors undertake activities to formulate general 
principles and guidelines and make them known to the board in order to steer 
the board and  
- the extent to which they control and scrutinize the behavior of members of the 
local executive (both the political executive and its bureaucratic apparatus).  
(cf. Lupia 2003: 35) 
 
In order to secure such accountability it is first important that the council develops the 
main criteria and guidelines that the political executive and the local administrative 
apparatus should observe. Councillors should value this as an important aspect of 
their role17. Such criteria and guidelines, subsequently, provide councillors with a 
framework for holding the political executive to account. Therefore, it is also 
important that councillors conceive of scrutiny as an important aspect of their role18. 
 
The results will be discussed as follows. First we describe different types of local 
councillors, based on organizational tenure. Then we look at the attitudinal change in 
general. This change is the result of both the socialization mechanism, and the exit 
and selective recruitment mechanism. Since, these mechanisms are difficult to 
separate we focus first on socialization (by tenure) by comparing cohorts. 
 
                                                 
17 1999: How important is it for you as a councillor to determine regulation, policy plans, and budgets? 
(scare 1-4: not very important – very important) 
We use three indicators since in 1999 the concept that combines these three elements did not yet exist. 
After 2002 these specific elements were combined in the Dutch phrase ‘kaderstellen’ (formulating 
general principles and guidelines to steer the board).   
2007: How important is it for you as a councillor to define the main goals of the municipal activity? 
(scale 0-4: not important – very important). Again the question wording and the range of the scale are 
somewhat different between 1999 and 2007. We again assume that the gist of the items is similar 
enough to warrant a comparison over time. Since the lowest score in 2007 (0) is never chosen we 
decided to ignore the scale difference. 
18 1999: How important is it for you as a councillor to control for a good execution of decisions taken? 
(scare 1-4: not very important – very important) 
2007: How important is it for you as a councillor to control the municipal activity? (scale 0-4: not 
important – very important). Again the question wording and the range of the scale are somewhat 
different between 1999 and 2007. We again assume that the gist of the items is similar enough to 
warrant a comparison over time. Since the lowest score in 2007 (0) is never chosen we decided to 
ignore the scale difference. 
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4.1 Different types of local councillors 
For our analysis of attitudinal change it will be useful to distinguish between three 
types of local councillors based on their organizational tenure. Those who are new in 
the council (freshmen, newly elected in the most recent municipal election), those 
who served for a maximum of one term (for the respondents in the 2007 survey, this 
implies that they had no experience under the pre-LGA 2002 regime), and those who 
have been a local councillor five or more years (for the respondents in the 2007 
survey, this implies that they also experienced the pre-LGA 2002 regime). The 
experience of the councillor is measured by the question ‘for how long have you been 
a local councillor (in total)?’  
Local councillors in 2007 spend on average 6,15 years in the council (N = 
1172). This is not different from the average amount of time spend in the council in 
1999 (6,11 years; N = 1475). The majority of local councillors in 2007 started their 
job after the introduction of the LGA 2002 (61,3%). Table 2 shows the representation 
of different types of councillors. The 2007 percentages are compared to the 1999 
distribution. The figures are rather similar. This is an important finding, which neither 
confirms fears that the council reforms would make the job of a councillor less 
attractive (leading to an exodus of experienced members), nor does it bear out the 
high hopes of some reformers that – on the contrary – the reforms would make the job 
of the councillor more interesting and perhaps less time-consuming (resulting in fewer 
dropouts and longer tenure).  
 
Table 2: Number of years experience as a local councillor in percentages 
Council experience 1999 (%) 2007 (%) 
Cohort I: 1 year 35,3 34,1 
Cohort II: 1-5 years 28,4 27,3 
Cohort III: > 5 years 36,3 38,6 
 
4.2 Attitudinal change at level of individual councillors 
Comparing the attitudes in 1999 and 2007 first of all indicates that councillors 
consider both representation and securing accountability as important tasks. All scores 
are in the range between 3.00 and 4.00 (either important or very important). These 
similarities notwithstanding, we can make two important observations. First, 
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considering activities of responsiveness and accountability, there is a shift towards 
accountability activities. This becomes especially clear by looking at the ranking 
figures: in 1999 responsiveness activities are perceived as more important than 
accountability activities, in 2007 this pattern is reversed. Second, this change is not so 
much the result of a decrease in importance of responsiveness activities (2007 scores 
not deviating much from the previous scores), but more the effect of an increasing 
saliency of accountability activities. 
 
Table 3: Comparing attitudes 1999 and 2007 
  1999 2007 
 Attitude towards activity  x (sd) ranking x (sd) ranking 
Responsiveness ‘representing’ 3.26 (0,78) 1 3.23 (0,74) 3 
 ‘explaining’ 3.12 (0,72) 2 3.03 (0,80) 4 
Accountability ‘defining main goals’ 3.06 (0,74) 4 3.60 (0,58) 1 
 ‘controlling’ 3.09 (0,76) 3 3.36 (0,67) 2 
Scale: 0 - 4 (not important to very important) 
 
Third, it is also remarkable that the increase in saliency is selective: in comparison to 
1999 the accountability activities have grown in importance, whereas there was no 
similar change in the subjective importance of responsiveness activities. This 
asymmetry does not reflect the dual normative case for the reforms that emphasized 
the importance of both concerns. Apparently local actors have prioritized the 
accountability goals of the reforms.19       
 
The question that now rises is how to explain this pattern change? In the first part of 
this paper we discussed two possible explanations: the socialization mechanism, and 
the exit and recruitment mechanism. To what extent do these mechanisms explain the 
observed attitudinal changes? The next section tries to answer this question. First we 
look into the socialization mechanism. 
 
                                                 
19 This also reflects the fact that most measures in the reform package (see Table 1) were targeted at an 
improvement of the position of the council vis-à-vis the BMA and not to the external orientation of the 
council in its relation to the citizenry.. 
 18
4.3 Change mechanisms 
If only the socialization mechanism would be responsible for the change that we 
observed in the previous section, we would expect that for the 2007 respondents the 
importance attached to responsiveness and accountability would co-vary with 
organizational tenure. Based on socialization theory we would expect that the reform 
values (accountability and responsiveness) would be most effectively inculcated in 
cohort II -- councillors with one term experience, under the new legal regime. The 
freshmen (cohort I) have yet to be fully socialized, whereas in cohort III, the 
socialization process may be less effective because it has to undo the results of 
previous socialization under the old legislative regime.20     
This would imply a curvilinear relationship between tenure and value change. In order 
to see if our expectation is right we compare the three previously distinguished tenure 
cohorts (Table 4).    
 
Table 4: 2007 socialization mechanism 
Attitude towards activity  Cohort I: 
1 year: x (sd) 
Cohort II 
1-5 years: x (sd) 
Cohort III 
>5 years: x (sd) 
‘representing’ 3,26 (,698) 3,19 (,753) 3,26 (,735) 
‘explaining’ 3,02 (,767) 3,06 (,784) 3,03 (,812) 
‘defining main goals’ 3,54 (,624) 3,61 (,577) 3,63 (,555) 
‘controlling’ 3,38 (,629) 3,36 (,686) 3,34 (,685) 
 
 Table 4 shows that there is no (real) and consistent differences between the 
three cohorts: the tenure hypothesis based on socialization theory is not corroborated. 
This result can be explained in a number of ways. First, the socialization mechanism 
may have been ineffective. Given the body of evidence in support of the impact of 
organizational socialization this is not a very plausible option. An alternative 
explanation is that results of organizational socialization have been attenuated by the 
recruitment mechanism. As a result of the recruitment process (as a combination of 
self-selection and selection by recruiters) all three cohorts of councillors elected in the 
2006 elections – irrespective of their socialization history – had a similar attitudinal 
                                                 
20 The resource-based-perspective would imply a different pattern in which cohort III would endorse 
the reform values even more strongly than cohort II. Previously we have argued, however, that we 
think the curvilinear pattern is more plausible.  
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profile. In order to probe this option we have subsequently tried to isolate a 
recruitment effect. Isolating a possible recruitment effect is most realizable when we 
compare new recruits in 2007 with their equals in 1999.21 We expect to see an 
increase in importance of responsiveness and accountability activities since the 2007 
recruits are selected and attracted by use of a different profile: one that supports the 
LGA2002 and the ideas behind it.22
 
Table 5: New councillors (Cohort I: 1 year experience) 1999 compared to 2007 
Attitude towards activity  1999: x (sd) 2007: x (sd) 
‘representing’ 3,28 (,828) 3,26 (,698) 
‘explaining’ 3,08 (,757) 3,02 (,767) 
‘defining main goals’ 3,05 (,530) 3,54 (,624) 
‘controlling’ 3,09 (,768) 3,38 (,629) 
 
Table 5 shows that for the freshmen there is an increase in importance for 
accountability activities. This confirms the hypothesis of a substantial recruitment 
effect in the case of the accountability activities. Further confirmation is provided by 
the fact that when we compare the changes (from 1999 to 2007) in cohort II  and III  
we find rather similar differences. This suggests that all three cohorts on the eve of the 
2006 elections went through a rather similar screen, a sieve that was different from 
the selection process in 1999; a selection process in which especially the 
accountability values were more heavily emphasized than before.23 Hence, there is a 
recruitment effect, one that explains the general change in attitude discussed in 
section 4.2. This brings forth the conclusion that socialization might have an 
influence, but always in combination with recruitment. Apparently recruitment has an 
equalizing effect on socialization. Of course there might be alternative explanations 
                                                 
21 After all, neither of these groups have been subjected to a lengthy socialization process in the 
organisation. 
22 As we saw before the patterns of change differ for the responsiveness and the accountability 
components. 
23 There is a third alternative, that of the 2002 council reforms and its supporting rhetoric have gone 
hand in hand with a swing in the public opinion climate. From this angle the reform rhetoric – 
emphasising accountability and responsiveness as desirable outcomes – either through genuine 
attitudinal change amongst councillors or through effects of social desirability may have brought about 
an exogenous change in councillor attitudes. We cannot rule out this alternative hypothesis, although it 
is hard to explain why – especially in the aftermath of the Fortuyn revolution – in this interpretation 
accountability values would change whereas the importance to responsiveness values would remain 
much the same as before.    
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for our findings. One would be to say that the findings are the result of the general 
opinion of this time (spirit of the time) or the result of social desirability. Explanations 




In this paper we aimed at establishing and explaining the attitudinal effects of a Dutch 
reform to strengthen the councillor as a representative and a scrutinizer. The Local 
Government Act 2002 was supposed to improve the responsiveness and 
accountability of the municipal council. This paper focused on the attitude of 
individual councillors towards responsiveness and accountability activities. This 
study’s results show that the reforms have resulted in a change in councillor role 
orientations. We have shown first of all that in line with the reform’s objectives 
councillors consider their scrutiny activities substantially more important than before 
the reforms. With regard to the representation function, however, we did not find 
evidence for similar changes. The reforms therefore appear to have been mainly 
successful in strengthening the council’s focus on its control and scrutiny functions. 
Moreover, we have also shown that this attitudinal change is likely to be largely a 
recruitment effect. Although socialization may is also important, the process of 
selection and self-selection, provides a mechanism that guarantees that only the 
councillors who are best adapted to the new council system “survive”. Hence, by 
selecting and attracting a specific type of councillor, one who fits the profile of a 
councillor working under the LGA2002, the attitude towards accountability activities 
(formulating mains goals of the municipal activity and controlling the board) is 
improved. In the next stage of our research we will also investigate the behavioural 
effects of the reforms for both councillors and councils.  
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